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Introduction 
Construction of new blocks of the Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP) PAKS 2 in Hungary last few months caused vigorous de-
bate in the media. Most of the titles, as always when it comes to 
radiation, is sensationalistic and encourages fear and concern of 
the Serbian population because of the proximity of a nuclear in-
stallations to our border. As the professional community does 
not sound a lot, spreading of fear is undisturbed. 
The exploitation of nuclear energy and the accelerated 
construction of NPPs began with the assertion that this is, 
unlike thermal power plants, environmentally clean, safe and 
secure energy production. However, reality shows that every 
ten years at least one large-scale nuclear accident happens, 
called major nuclear accident, which can endanger people 
and the environment. Currently there are over 440 NPPs ope-
rating in the world. None of them is in Serbia 1. 
This spring marks the 30th anniversary of the accident in 
the Chernobyl NPP, one of the largest in the history of the appli-
cation of nuclear energy and 5 years from the accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP, which was just by chance not overco-
me by the harmful effects. Although geographically distant, the-
se events had a profound influence on Serbia and entire Europe-
an continent, not only by harmful effects on the health of the 
population and the environment, but also influenced public opi-
nion and attitude towards nuclear energy as well as the defence 
and response organization in the event of accident. It became 
definitely clear that accidents of this type, which are not limited 
by political and national borders, can only be tackled through jo-
int and synchronized activities. This attitude has led to the la-
unch of a number of joint activities under the auspices of inter-
national organizations (United nation – UN, the World Health 
Organization WHO, International Atomic Energy Agency – 
IAEA): education, synchronization, joint team creation, pro-
grams of mutual assistance and notification, mutual long-term 
monitoring of late effects.  
Each of these accidents was analyzed in all respects to 
observe the slightest flaw and find solutions to overcome the 
observed and the prevention of recurrence of error. In most 
countries such accident was the cause to review their respon-
se plans in case of accident, and improve them by incorpora-
ting new knowledge. As members of the Team for response 
in the event of radiation accidents and consequence monito-
ring, we wanted to remind of both Chernobyl and Fukushima 
Daiichi accident.  
The aim is to analyze preparedness of our country for 
the event of a new nuclear accident and whether we have re-
ason for concern about the construction of new reactors in 
the NPP Paks 2 in Hungary. 
Chernobyl vs Fukushima Daiichi accident 
It was written a lot about Chernobyl accident in previo-
us years, so we will look back at it only through important 
Correspondence to: Branka Djurović, Military Medical Academy, Crnotravska 17, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia.  
E-mail: djurovic.branka@gmail.com 
Vol. 73, No. 5 VOJNOSANITETSKI PREGLED Page 485 
facts and for the purpose of comparison with other accident. 
Chernobyl accident happened on April 26th, 1986 as a 
consequence of two subsequent explosions in one of four nu-
clear reactors of the Chernobyl NPP (Unit 4). Explosions 
were caused by a few factors, but mostly by manmade mis-
takes and some technical imperfections. They caused large 
radioactive release in a very short time. Additionally, high 
temperatures in the reactor caused further melting of the re-
maining fuel, which caused prolonged radioactive emission 
for the next thirty days. It is estimated that the total amount 
of radioactive release was 5,300 PBq, 200 hundred times 
higher than radioactivity used on Hiroshima 2, 3. Radioactive 
cloud released at the time of explosion (450 PBq) was 
expelled 9 km high in the atmosphere, and later on carried by 
the winds over many European countries, first over Scandi-
navian countries, then changing direction of the air currents 
contaminated Poland, Czechoslovakia, southern parts of 
Germany, Austria, and finally South and Southeast winds ac-
companied by rain showers have led to contamination of 
Balkan countries. Most of the radioactive fallout was disper-
sed over Belarus, Ukraine and Russia 4, 5.  
During the first three days of the accident iodine-131 
(I-131) was the most dangerous for the health of residents 
of contaminated areas, and then dominated cesium-137 
(Cs-137) and strontium-90 (Sr-90), and to a lesser extent, 
plutonium-241 (Pu-241) 6. In addition to these radioactive 
elements, “hot particles” were found in the cloud, which 
had the same composition as irradiated nuclear fuel from 
the damaged reactor. From the very beginning Chernobyl 
accident was proclaimed as Major accident, according to the 
International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) level 7 event, 
which is the largest-scale accident, which endangers the en-
vironment and population. Employees of the NPP, as well as 
rescue teams, mainly firefighters, soldiers and medical te-
ams with superhuman efforts and numerous human sacrifi-
ces did everything to prevent the worst. Estimated by 
expert commissions, Chernobyl accident, regardless nume-
rous causes, was primarily the result of human error. The 
accident of such large scale was not even considered in the 
document for the risk assessment and plans for the 
Chernobyl NPP emergencies 6. 
On the contrary, Fukushima Daiichi accident did not 
arise suddenly, but developed over several weeks. This is the 
accident with highest number of human casualties and des-
truction and largest in Japan since World War II. At the same 
time it is a unique blend of natural disasters 7, 8. Problems on 
NPP began after the devastating earthquake of magnitude 9 
at the moment magnitude scale and tsunami which followed 
very quickly. Although Japan is a country where earthquakes 
are not uncommon, this earthquake, whose epicenter was 
only 180 km from the NPP, for its strength, destructive 
power and the extent of the territory that was affected, was 
the fourth measured in the last 60 years. In the affected 
territory, with 5 NPP, with a total of 15 reactors, of which 11 
were in operation, only in the NPP Fukushima Daiichi da-
mage was caused to vital parts, while in the other NPPs da-
mage was caused to the parts of the equipment which were 
of minor importance 9. 
In the NPP Fukushima Daiichi occurred severe core 
damage in three of the six reactors for which it was announ-
ced as the accident INES Level 3 event. At that time (March 
12th) most of released materials were radioactive noble gases 
(xenon-133). At the time of the earthquake there were 6,400 
employees in the plant and three days later, after the evacua-
tion and willful abandonment of the NPP, remained about 
700. At that time release of hydrogen and radioactive materi-
als occurred and accident announced as INES level 5 event. 
As a result of earthquake, power supply from external sour-
ces was interrupted that caused stoppage of cooling system 
of the three operational reactors. Generators for emergency 
situations were later activated, but due to increase of tempe-
rature and pressure there were an explosion of released 
hydrogen and release of radioactive I-131 at the speed of 
1015 Bq/h and physical damage of three reactor buildings. At 
that time, INES level 6 event was announced. A fortunate 
circumstance was that the winds carried the radioactive cloud 
until March 15 towards the Pacific Ocean. On March 15 
wind direction changed and the radioactivity was spilled on 
land north-west of the NPP, when accident was announced as 
level 7 INES scale event. Workers of NPP did not succeed in 
checking the extent of damage to the reactor and generator 
caused by earthquake, when tsunami came. The main tsuna-
mi was 13 m high. After it there was a flood, and a signifi-
cant part of the plant found itself under water, at some places 
more than 5 m. That approach was unusable for repairs 1. 
The greatest part of radioactivity in the Pacific Ocean 
was spilled during March and April 2011 through contamina-
ted water that flowed from the NPP and contained radioacti-
ve I-131 and Cs-137. That process, to a lesser extent, conti-
nued 5 years after the accident 10, 11. Although three reactors 
were involved in this accident, the estimated released 
radioactivity was 520 PBq, or 10% of radioactivity released 
from the Chernobyl accident. The greatest part of 
radioactivity was deposited in the Pacific Ocean during 
March and April that year 3, 11.  
Japanese NPP in its Risk Assessment Act had instructi-
ons on the procedure in case of earthquake, tsunami or flo-
ods, but the intensity of each of the resulting disasters 
significantly exceeded the maximum assumed value made at 
the time of its construction. That act has been repeatedly cor-
rected according to the recommendations of meteorological 
services, and although protective systems have been upgra-
ded in accordance with the recommendations, it turned out 
that they were not sufficient to defend against each of the di-
sasters occurring individually. The situation in which a NPP 
is simultaneously affected by three natural disasters was not 
even presumed in these documents. The defense was further 
aggravated by disruption of communication and reduction of 
the number of employees in terms of the increased need 8. 
The workers who remained, bearing in mind that many of 
them received doses that significantly exceeded the permit-
ted levels, showed a remarkable level of consciousness and 
even sacrificed their own lives. However, in this event a hu-
ge number of serious flaws was noticed, misjudgements and 
decisions, and above all a high degree of improvisation, sin-
ce there was no plan to respond to that kind of accident. The-
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refore, the conclusion of the commission that investigated 
the accident was that it was “manmade disaster – that could 
and should have been foreseen and prevented”. And that was 
despite the fact that the accident was initiated by disasters 12. 
These two accidents have confirmed that each nuclear 
accident is unique. According to the mechanism different, 
yet they have a lot of similarities. First among them is that, 
regardless of the high technology and the number of measu-
res of control and protection, they can never assume the enti-
re unwanted and risky situations. Second, that in such a 
contingency, regardless of the expertise of the staff and their 
extraordinary efforts, human error easily occurs. 
The consequences of accidents on environment 
In both accidents there was a significant irreversible 
contamination of environment. In case of the Chernobyl ac-
cident 150,000 km2 of the territory of Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine were highly contaminated, and therefore evacuated 
in the radius of 30 km. In the highly contaminated territories 
of Ukraine and Belarus at the time of the accident lived more 
than 8 million people, of whom 2 million children. Around 
350,000 of them were evacuated or fled their homes. These 
zones are still largely uninhabited 13, 14.  
European continent is less contaminated, but 45,000 
km2 of European countries, including Serbia, have high le-
vels of contamination 5. Never before in the history of the 
use of nuclear energy was one territory as contaminated. Ta-
king into account that in addition to I-131 (half-life of 8 
days), also present are Cs-137 (half-life 30 years) and Sr-90 
(half-life 28 years), contamination of the territory can be 
considered long-term. According to the experts of Greenpea-
ce, because of the high contamination of long-lived transura-
nic radionuclides, a radius of 10 km around the NPP will not 
be ready for the return of residents for tens of thousands of 
years. 
People who live in the contaminated terrain are con-
fronted with everyday problems of contaminated food and 
water. Cs and Sr enter the food chain mimicking their 
physiological analogues potassium and calcium thus contri-
buting to the overall contamination of the living world. Over 
the past three decades, residents of border regions which are 
not displaced have limited the intake of radioactive substan-
ces in different ways, limiting dose, using foods that are not 
grown on contaminated territory, regime of diet in accordan-
ce with the level of contamination of certain foods (ETHOS 
project), etc. Today, 30 years later, there are no social bene-
fits as in former years. People are forced to feed on agricultu-
ral products grown in the contaminated territories and feel 
abandoned and sacrificed from the society 1, 15. 
Although the values of Cs and Sr in the environment 
have been reduced by half, there are areas where they are 
still high, such as forests and humid parts of the wetland 
(over 30% of the territory). Forests are a kind of reservoir of 
contamination because they cannot be decontaminated and 
can scatter contamination in different ways. Inhabitants of 
these regions use natural products (mushrooms, forest fruits 
blueberries, venison and fish) daily, significantly raising the-
ir radioactivity intake. Cs-137 level of mushrooms samples is 
16 times higher than allowed. Samples of milk used for chil-
dren nutrition few hundred kilometers away from Chernobyl 
contain levels of Cs-137 significantly exceeding set limit va-
lues. Feeding cows with rotten grass from wet terrain which 
contains elevated concentrations of radioactive material, inc-
reases contamination of milk that directly endangers chil-
dren. The main problem is the control of foodstuffs. Those 
sold in shops are controlled by state laboratories, but food 
sold “on the street” nobody controls. Lack of financial reso-
urces for the organization and implementation of large-scale 
monitoring is an essential problem of establishing control 1. 
A special type of population exposure comes from fo-
rest wood used for heating. The ash created by burning wood 
is used for spreading on arable land, and contains twenty ti-
mes more Sr-90 than timber sample. This further contamina-
tes agricultural land, and indirectly, all agricultural products 
that are grown on these plots. In conditions of incurred con-
tamination when no one controls the forests they represent a 
big risk because of the possibility of the occurrence of forest 
fires. In the period after the accident over 1,000 forest fires 
were formed. The resulting ash and smoke contain radionuc-
lides which increase air pollution 1. 
In case of Fukushima Daiichi accident a lucky circum-
stance was that most of the radioactive material, as much as 
80%, was deposited in the Pacific Ocean. In Fukushima ac-
cident 140,000 residents have been evacuated: 78,000 were 
instantly evacuated from the immediate area surrounding the 
NPP, and later 62,000 from zones that were subsequently 
contaminated by radioactive cloud 8. Contamination control 
of water, milk and food was immediately organized. In the 
first days after the accident leading contaminant in food and 
water was I-131, so the iodine prophylaxis was recommen-
ded. Although there was sufficient provision, distribution 
and the beginning of prophylaxis were late and have started 
on the fourth day, when majority of inhabitants of the con-
taminated territory have already been evacuated 16, 17. As in 
the case of the Chernobyl accident, these zones are uninhabi-
ted and thus should stay for a long time 18 . 
A few days after the accident the direction of the air 
current changed so that about 20% of the released 
radioactivity contaminated terrestrial territories of Japan 
northwest of the NPP, which is much smaller contaminated 
area than in the Chernobyl accident. These areas are mounta-
in forested landscapes that are not densely populated, houses 
are scattered and often surrounded by forest. The inhabitants 
of these regions, 62,000 of them were evacuated during the 
accident and the majority is still in temporary accommodati-
on with regular social benefits from the government of Ja-
pan 19. Evacuation of the population was not well organized, 
reported even as chaotic. Residents were relocated several 
times from place to place, they often rejected transfer, and 
transportation of immobile patients and old people was not 
well organized. Many old and immobile remained on conta-
minated ground. All this has led to a loss of confidence in the 
authorities of Japan and new actions 20. In the same way as in 
the vicinity of Chernobyl residents can be further contamina-
ted. Unlike Chernobyl accident when Soviet government 
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delayed ban on the consumption of food, the Japanese go-
vernment immediately banned the use of all foods from this 
area and provided financial compensation 6, 21. 
The level of contamination is still high and the inhabitants 
of these villages, including children, could receive annual doses 
of 20 mSv/y, which is the limit for occupationally exposed per-
sons by international standards. It is significantly higher than the 
dose for the members of the public in non-accidental situations 
(1 mSv/y), and the dose in the Belarusian villages (5 mSv/y). In 
spite of that, Japan government made decision to apply the limit 
for occupationally exposed persons on occupants of this area 
starting from 2018, when it will abolish all social benefits to di-
splaced persons. The decision was made because the govern-
ment cannot finance decontamination of this area which is 
roughly estimated to more than 50 billion USD. Therefore, aro-
und 55,000 residents would be forced to return to their contami-
nated homes. This risk is considered to be unacceptable, 
especially for children 22.  
From both cases it can be concluded that the contamina-
ted territories remain unusable for people because of their di-
rect impact on health and impossibility to produce basic 
crops. Evacuation of the population due to contamination re-
presents economic and social collapse of the region. Decon-
tamination, monitoring and regular controls are extremely 
expensive and, as they should be organized tens, even hun-
dreds of years, not economically feasible. These costs cannot 
be beared by countries of less economic power (Ukraine and 
Belarus), nor could be by economically the most powerful 
country in the world (Japan). Attitudes of state institutions on 
these issues are often contradictory to attitudes of indepen-
dent professional organizations. 
 
Health effects 
 
There is a lot about health effects that we still do not 
know. However, it is certain that there is no unified position 
on the extent and type of health effects, primarily due to our 
incomplete knowledge of low-level dose effects. It is almost 
certain that we will never know all about them, because of 
lack of the dosimetry results and accurate epidemiological 
data which are necessary to make a judgment. 
 
Acute health effects 
 
During the Chernobyl accident the most exposed was 
personnel of the NPP and rescuers (firefighters, army and 
medical personnel). Over 1,000 people have been engaged at 
the NPP but they neither possessed equipment for dosimetry, 
nor for personal dosimetry in accidental conditions. Fire and 
medical teams found themselves on the spot after 15 min. As 
the dose in the control room were several hundred Gy/h, and 
at the facility over 100 Gy/h, people involved were exposed 
to huge doses, and due to acute radiation syndrome first pati-
ents were hospitalized during the first hour. Local doses were 
up to 20 times higher. According to official reports during 
the first 12 hours 132 people were hospitalized. With the su-
spicion of acute radiation illness 273 people were hospitali-
zed, while the diagnosis was confirmed in 132, and 28 
workers had lethal ending 23. Extraordinary efforts and the 
introduction of innovations in the diagnosis and therapy of 
acute radiation illness (“heroic therapy”) half lethal dose 
(LD-50) increased from 3.25 Gy to 10 Gy. In June 1986 spe-
cialized hospitals in Moscow, Minsk and Kiev were establis-
hed for the treatment of the Chernobyl accident victims 5. It 
must be pointed out that there are indications and some aut-
hors claim that the number of injuries in the acute phase was 
several times higher than indicated in the official reports 24.  
Among the residents of the nearest town of Pripyat there 
were no cases of acute radiation illness. However, the doses 
were high, even 1,000 times higher than natural. At the night of 
the accident 40,000 residents were evacuated in only 3 h from 
the circle of 10 km and a few days after 150,000 residents from 
the circle of 30 km. Prophylactic distribution of potassium iodi-
de was organized for the residents of Pripyat within 12 h, but it 
was not organized for the residents of the wider circle of the 
contaminated zone, which is considered one of the greatest fai-
lures of the health system during the accident 15, 24, 25 . 
Residents support by health services consisted of 2,000 
physicians, 4,000 technicians, and 1,200 final year medical 
students. They did more than 600,000 examinations, 215,300 
on children, a huge number of laboratory analyzes (radiomet-
ric, biochemical, hematological, immunological and 
cytogenetic) 15, 26. 
Fukushima Daiichi accident was induced by natural di-
sasters, earthquake and tsunami that brought widespread des-
truction of material goods (losses exceeding $ 200 billion) 
and a large number of human casualties (15,900 dead and 
2,600 missing). A large number of deaths and injuries had 
nothing to do with radioactive contamination that followed 1. 
As already mentioned, the evacuation and care were not 
satisfactory, which can be explained by devastation caused 
by natural disasters. In ordinary situations, Japan is a country 
with an extremely organized radiation medicine, so that per-
son injured in a radiation accident can be transported to a 
specialized institution within two hours. 
Long-term health effects 
Long-term effects of Chernobyl accident are the main 
point of controversy for 30 years. They should be expected 
in workers exposed to high doses, as well as inhabitants, no 
matter if evacuated or left at in their homes in the contamina-
ted area. The fact is that after Chernobyl accident more than 
600 million people live in less or more contaminated enviro-
nment 24. Different ways and time of exposure, dose, dose ra-
te, type of radiation are some of factors influencing onset of 
late-effects. Radiation-induced late-effects such as malignant 
diseases, cytogenic changes, and congenital anomalies were 
in the focus. By time, non-radiation effects came in focus be-
cause of their high incidence and their influence on quality of 
life. At last, social and psychological changes should not be 
neglected. People evacuated from contaminated zones are 
higher suicidal, depressive or anxious, abuse alcohol and 
drugs, have very low birth-rate, etc 1, 24. 
Based on Hiroshima victims data, WHO and IAEA es-
timated that Chernobyl accident could induce additional can-
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cers in exposed population in the next years depending on 
the latent period – from 5 years (for leukemia) to 30 years 
(for solid tumors). Registers of Ukraine and Belarus, as well 
as many authors do not agree with the estimation and point 
out that the risk is highly underestimated. According to these 
national Registers general cancer morbidity in most exposed 
regions of Belarus and Ukraine increased 40% and 22% till 
2000, respectively. In both countries a higher increase was in 
children above 17 years and liquidators 27, 28. According to 
these data, additional radiation-induced cancers just in Bela-
rus could be up to 62,500 in the next 70 years 29. 
Thyroid cancer is one of the main malignant diseases in 
Chernobyl victims. It is predominantly, almost always 
papillary type, very aggressive, fast growing and early metas-
tatic tumor. The highest rate was noticed in children of Belarus 
10 years after with 43-fold rate from 1989 to 1994, and 200-
fold than before the accident 30. The increase in thyroid cancer 
rate has been noticed in contaminated European countries, but 
in a much lower rate. It is estimated that total number of 
thyroid cancers could be from 47,000–140,000 cases 29. Simi-
lar situation is noticed with leukemia. After shorter latent peri-
od (from few months to 7 years) the incidence increased in all 
population groups, with the highest rate in children of mostly 
contaminated regions. The same trend was observed in conta-
minated European countries (1.5-fold till 1987 in Germany, 
2.5-fold in Greece, 37% in Great Britain) 25, 31.  
A high radiosensitivity in children is correlated with high 
incidence of congenital malformations, lower-birth weight, 
thyroid gland diseases, leukemia, genetic changes. Tne num-
ber of healthy children is still decreasing every year 26, 31. The 
same kind of disturbances, but with lower rate was noticed in 
many other European countries, such as Finland, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Turkey, Sweeden) 32, 33 .  
The increased incidence in morbidity (accelerating age, 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, immunological disor-
ders, diseases of urogenital system, and disturbances of central 
nervous and musculoskeletal system, cataract, and diseases of 
the thyroid gland, especially cancer, leukemia) is noticed in 
adults as well as in children. The incidence rate of these diseases 
increased 3–4% per year, and is higher than before the accident, 
or in people from uncontaminated zones. Ten years after, 94% 
of liquidators are not healthy. All the effects mentioned above 
are dose-depended, and noticed in other species as well, and the-
refore cannot be attributable to posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) or some other psychological disturbance 24.  
It is the endless list of diseases and statistics, proving one 
or another attitude. The fact is that all the risk assessments are 
connected with some kind of financial compensation, state or 
political decisions, and above all, global attitude towards nuclear 
energy. Combined with the lack of date (dosimetric or epide-
miological) it is ideal soil for ongoing debates and pro- and con-
tra- controversies. The risk should not be neglected, and follow-
up studies and long-term monitoring are necessary. 
 
Serbia 
 
What is the situation in our country? A number of 
questions are imposed: What are the consequences of the 
Chernobyl accident in our country today? How much have 
we learned from the Chernobyl accident? How much have 
we done to improve protection of our people? 
The Chernobyl accident significantly affected the envi-
ronmental conditions in our country. The territory of the 
former Yugoslavia was on the path of the radioactive cloud. 
Unfavorable circumstances were heavy rain showers that ha-
ve contributed to a significant deposit of radionuclides. 
Immediately after the accident systematic measurements of 
environmental samples in our country began. Measurements 
were performed by laboratories of many relevant institutions. 
Most laboratories performed gamma-spectrometry measure-
ments by scintillation (NaI) or semiconductor high-purity 
germaniume (HPGe) counters of high sensitivity 34.  
Measurements were carried out on samples of soil, air, 
water, milk and dairy products, many foodstuffs, as a 
primary source of contamination for the population at diffe-
rent locations throughout the country. In addition, measure-
ments included the so-called bioindicators of radiation con-
tamination, such as moss, lichen, grass, honey, mushrooms 
and others. Based on the measurement results, the transfer of 
radionuclides was estimated in certain areas of soil, to grass, 
then to milk, and, at the end to man. In the vast majority of 
the samples elevated levels of I-131 and Cs-137 were detec-
ted. Thus, for example, the exposure rate in Belgrade during 
the accident was elevated 5 times, until the end of the year 
and remained 2 times higher; in the region of Tara, Zlatibor 
and Durmitor it was 2–3 times higher 35. Natural waters (Da-
nube) have also been contaminated, as well as sediments, 
maintained after the accident for 20 years 36. 
During the accident the population was kept informed 
about the kind of food contaminated. Acute health effects were 
not noticed except a widespread worry and anxiety about he-
alth, especially children. A few years later the increase in the 
number of hematological malignant diseases, and later on 
thyroid gland, breast, lung, digestive tract malignancies were 
noticed. Diseases are diagnosed in younger age and in more 
aggressive forms than before the Chernobyl accident.  
Due to direct impact of I-131 and positive epidemiologi-
cal data from other regions, special attention is attracted by the 
increased incidence of thyroid cancer. According to data from 
Cancer Registry for Serbia the incidence of thyroid carcinoma 
in Serbia is constantly growing, at a rate faster than for any ot-
her malignancy. The most common type is papillary thyroid 
carcinoma in all age groups and both sexes (more in women 
than in men 3.3 : 1). Data for Serbia do not differ significantly 
from those of other European countries 31, 37. Serbia would be 
considered as a country with medium rate for women and low 
rate for men. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the largest 
increase is among women aged 20–29 years. Iodine deficiency 
as a possible cause can be excluded, because Serbia is not a 
region deficient in iodine and has standardized iodination of 
table salt 38. The increase incidence of malignant diseases, 
congenital anomalies, immunological and metabolic disorders 
was noticed in children. 
Serbia has no NPPs, but can be threatened by an acci-
dent in a nuclear facility abroad. At 1,000 km from the bor-
ders of Serbia there are 21 NPPs with 44 reactors, of which 6 
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NPPs with 12 reactors at 500 km from the border. The clo-
sest NPPs are located in Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. All belong to the older generation NPPs. In case of 
accidents in these NPPs, and appropriate weather conditions, 
the territory of Serbia may be contaminated in a few hours. 
The specific weather conditions can lead to high contamina-
tion of the territory of Serbia very quickly. 
The NPP PAKS 2 is planned to replace two of the four 
existing nuclear reactors. Hungarian project is very important 
for all neighboring countries, especially Serbia, due to its 
proximity to the Serbian border of about 100 km and the di-
rect connection to Danube. Therefore, it is reasonable to dis-
cuss the cross-border environmental pollution and the impact 
on health of the population. Respecting international regula-
tions the Government of Hungary has sent the Risk Asses-
sment Act to 30 countries for discussion. This document dis-
cusses the risk zone of 500 m around the NPP and cross-
border risks in the ordinary work of NPP. The act alleged to 
NPP PAKS 2 will not adversely affect environmental condi-
tions in Serbia: it will not pollute the air (none of the pollu-
ters), will not affect the water quality of the Danube (no 
composition, no temperature), the terrestrial and aquatic 
wildlife, and the environment of the community. The half of 
the involved countries had complains and asked for interna-
tional revision of the Act 39. 
Is Serbia ready to react in the case of nuclear accident 
and potential emergency situations? 
Serbia is a signatory to the International Convention on 
Early Warning of Radiation Accidents and the Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in case of accident. For early notification 
on the territory of Serbia a system of 9 fixed stations is organi-
zed to measure intensity of ambient equivalent dose of gamma 
radiation. All data are collected and processed by the Serbian 
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (SRPNA) to 
other countries. The National Plan for Response in Case of  
Radiation Emergency is under jurisdiction of the Agency, too.  
The National Plan for Response in Case of Radiation 
Emergency has been in draft version for several years.  
A change is needed due to reorganization of the state admini-
stration sector, which is transferred from the Ministry of De-
fence to Ministry of Interior. This service cannot meet all the 
requirements of an accidental situation due to the lack of ma-
terial and personal resources and need immediate activity of 
other relevant services. A whole series of problems showed 
up, and IAEA has offered help of expert mission that 
reviewed the plan, facilities, equipment and organization of 
the whole system planned in the said draft plan. IAEA 
experts analyzed the draft and pointed out the flaws of the 
plan with the representatives of relevant institutions. 
The crucial part of the National Plan is emergency care 
and treatment of the injured. This part of the plan is under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. According to the 
experience of previous nuclear accidents, it would be 
necessary that the Ministry of Health: make a detailed plan 
of engagement of medical institutions and a strict division of 
debts in order to avoid chaotic activity; facilitate the work of 
emergency teams which, are not equipped, nor trained, for a 
nuclear accident response; it should organize and provide tra-
ining and necessary equipment; enable continuous medical 
assistance to evacuees; establish the conditions and modaliti-
es of iodine prophylaxis, from the procurement, storage and 
distribution of potassium iodide according to defined priori-
ties; develop the guidance on timescales for the application 
of iodine to current recommendations (a few hours before 
exposure to 6 h after); to publish detailed instructions for the 
preparation of doses for children; organize triage and decon-
tamination; ensure continuing education and training for nuc-
lear accident response to all medical staff; take care of food 
and water- based on the results of measurements to ban or 
authorize use of water and food. 
The very same questions were burning 10 years ago, 
when we marked 20 years of the Chernobyl accident 40.  
Some progress in preparedness for nuclear emergency 
was accomplished, but unacceptably slowly. A lot of unsol-
ved problems are still to be solved. We hope that lessons le-
arned from previous accidents in NPPs, and construction of 
new nuclear reactors in front of our doors, will be sufficient 
impulse for urgent action.  
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